

SECRET

Box 30
Fldr. 10
Doc. 3TAB B: CIA Pay. on the Inquiry

2. b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AMLAH operation inaccurately. "The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assas. of JFK, in order to support the SSC view ^{that it} should have been reported to the WC.
- c. question of aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/27/62 to Havana
see "Unidentified Air Passengers" ~~file~~ folder

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962

11/26/63 cable DIR 85133, 26. 11. 63
sent to (Paris, Rome, Madrid, ¹⁴⁻⁶ Copenhagen, ¹⁴⁻¹ Oslo, ¹⁴⁻¹ Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London & Ottawa) - requesting any scrap info which bears on JFK's assas.

replies on 11/27/63:

19-1 (HELS) 2299 (IN 68739), ~~22~~ 11/27/63
(ROME) 1235 (IN 68802) " "
(OTTA) 1275 (IN 69005) " "
19-6 (COPE) 3469 (IN 69011) " "
(LOND) 6097 (IN 69100) " "
(OTTA) 1277 (IN 69233) " 11/11/1938
19-4 (OSLO) 4490 (IN 69290) " "
(MADR) 9789 (IN 69328) 11/28/63
(BRUS) 8739 (IN 69352) 11/29/63
(ROME) 1258 (IN 70111) " "
(PARI) 1776 (IN 74234) 12/5/63
(PARI) 1833 (IN 77148) 12/10/63
(PARI) 1845 (IN 77397) SECRET "

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(LOND) 6097 (CIN 69100) 11/27/63
4 (London) reported that British journalist
claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in
1959 - Santos (Happunite), lives in luxury
in jail, Santos visits frequently by the
Americ. gangster Rudy.

(OTTA) 1277 (CIN 69233) 11/27/63
(O. Harva) reported delight of Cuban embassy
staff over JFK death & instructions from
govt to cease looking happy in public
19-4

(OSLO) 4490 (CIN 69290) 11/27/63
14-4 (8 sls) reported Soviet shock - blame asss.
on extreme right-winger

Other than above, initial response produced
no other info.

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to (Hague)
(Frankfurt) on Oswald's travel back to USSR
12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to (Berlin)
(Frankfurt, Bonn) & (The Hague)
(Bonn) 5579 (FN 73338) 12/4/63
(HAGU) 5116 (FN 73378) 11
(MUNI) 8316 (CIN 75065) 12/6/63
(STUT) 5545 (FN 76758) 12/9/63
(ESNT) 1400 12/9/63

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above reporting produced details about Oswald's
travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands
enroute to US in June 1962

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- 5 No evidence found through these queries
+ related queries tying the S.O. to Oswald's
assass. of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Cable to Mex Cy on 11/28/63 DIR 85655,

"We have by no means excluded the
possibility that other as yet unknown
persons may have been involved or
even that other powers may have
played a role. Please continue all your
coverage of Soviet and Cuban ~~installations~~
and ²⁴your liaison w/ Mexicans]"

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63

Please follow all leads + tips - Question
if Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63

Continue watch of Soviets + Cubans for complicity,
propagandizing about the case. "FYI only,
Soviet Intel in India had letter sent
to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding
full investigation of case."

(HMMW-12193), 17.12.16 12/17/63 11111940

7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mex Cy section
commending them on job well done

"Your (HIFWUOY) data, the statements of
Selva Duran, and your analyses were
major factors in the quick clarification
of the case, blanking out the really
ominous spectre of foreign backing"

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III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84608, 22.11.63

all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. - Be on quick alert while new Pres. Take over the reins"

8 "Were there relevant or significant information in the subject (of JFK assassination) or Oswald, it would have been reported ~~in~~ either in response to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources."

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, w/ Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

9 ~~that~~ would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

comment in HQ dispatch to Mex City Sta on 12/17/63 - (174 MW) 12193, 17.12.63 re limited reporting from other stations ".... this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life...."

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in contrast to SSC report, citing extensive U.S. intelligence network in Cuba, FOR says that

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9 There were no penetrations of CASTRO's inner circle where any info on subject (JFK assassination) would exist,

10 However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements

IV. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mystery passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11 7 flight of 11/22 & 11/25 to Cuba from Mexico were passenger flights -
7 flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/ 1 passenger - the man referred to in Book II SSC.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights, filing cable reports to HQ. [CIA had surveillance team, [as did the Mexicans] which provided photos of passports, + ^{copies} passenger list)

Also have (LIEN VOY telephone tap) against Cuban Embassy (of transcripts of conversations w/ Cuban office & Mexican Airport Control Office.)

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11/22/1963 Flight SECRET

12 Book II of SSC Final Report states CIA could not explain, at time of SSC writing why no record of follow-up on 11/22/63 flights. "In fact, the SSC was advised

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12 that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the (surveillance noted above) which bears directly on the subject.

13 "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight for Mex City to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and mislabeled the SSC unit summary, the matter."

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight in CIA passing report to FBI & FBI not doing followup investigation for WC

15 IGR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report - after position

1) Mex City Sta did not cable HQ that man looked suspicious. There was a 12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227) which reported the man had crossed at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63, what registered at hotel in Mex City on 11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63 & was only passenger on Cubana flight that night - good photo of him taken at airport

2) dispatch followed (HMMA-22579, 12/5/63) repeating info & enclosing photograph & containing following:

"Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious"

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15 also internal memo in Mex Cy -
see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63
which stated that the man was
reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 (Monterey Base) Cable 3/19/64
(MNTY) - 0829 (IN 43193) - info
on Cuban American 7/12/63 flight
had by agent [Mexican federale]

" The following should be noted about
the report: it misspelled the
man's name; it offered a bare state-
ment that he "was involved in the
Kennedy assassination"; it states
that he entered Mexico "on foot"
from Laredo, Texas (according to the
SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded
that he entered by automobile); it
asserts that he stayed at the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico Cy (while the date
and time of his registration and check-
out at a specific hotel in Mexico
Cy, where he stayed, were known); it
gave an incorrect number for his passport;
and, it stated that his Mexican tourist
card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when
it was known to have been issued in
Tampa, Florida). "

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17 Mex Cy Sta response to [Monterey
station] cable contributes to confusion on the
episode. When Mex Cy Sta received
cable, the Deputy Chief of station replied

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17 IN MEXI - 8746 (IN 43946) 3/20/64
that the information in (Monterrey)
report "jibe fully w/ that provided
Station by Mex Cy source, 4 December
63".

"The mistake of that cable cannot
be explained today, but wrong
it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not
collecting more info. on the man is
not well founded. It had no
real sources w/ access to info
concerning him: when a defector from
Cuba became available & such
information he was queried and the
results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA Operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA provided considerable
material for the investigation (see Tab E)
that more was not reported is a meaning-
ful indication what was known (then
by those actually involved (in Cuban
operations & supply of info to W.C.), as
distinguished from what might be hypo-
thesized at a later date. To contend
to the contrary - which has been
suggested by some - would require a
unanimous conspiracy of many American
citizens, employees of CIA, many of
whom knew aspects of even the most
closely guarded activities, 11

11-11-1945
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7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 -
Operations to Split
CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK
operation)

{Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez}
{Enrique Cayardo Robles}

Cuban exile - developed operational
concept to overthrow
the CASTRO gov - known
as the Leonardo Plan

8 (Moreno) assoc'ia in Miami

Jorge Agbunzyc Volsky
Cuban citizen of polish origin

married Cuban national after WWII
reportedly imprisoned following B.P. govt
reportedly avoided Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/ Ad Szulc
Szulc claimed he got contacts - it was
through his intercession that Leonardo
Plan gained gov - level support & approval
↓ Richard Goodwin was Szulc contact at W. H.
Volsky & Szulc met Robert Hurwitt
1. State Dept opposed to discuss the
plan - he presented the idea to CIA
CIA assigned it to Man Salas &
became known as AMTRUNK

→ 4/17/63 - Szulc tells Hurwitt that Miami Station gave
Volsky resp'ty to decide if operation to proceed not
consistent w/ CIA intentions
9 early Sept 1963 - AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence
sources in CUBA

1 [Miguel A. Diaz Dalgue]⁰⁵

2 [Ramon Guiza Hector Robello]

3 [Moreno Orosco Basulto]

[Gus] was reportedly close to AMLAASH/1

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- 10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate (Moreno⁰⁵) from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion + poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in estab. org. or any capabilities for action

- 11 Szulc + Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

- 12 also Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez
Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

- 13 Manure Corp - held job until 1960 when apptd Chief of Rural Housing, defected to US in 1962 - [recruited by JMWAVE Sta & used in AMTRUNK activities] - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison but set free in July or August of 1967.
"There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven."

- 14 FGR Days & very little planning + overall progress on AMTRUNK during FFK's life

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New Considerations in the Syndicate Operation

14

15

"While Orta (Juan) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info. on the Cuban leadership."

16

17

It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro got re gamblers, Orta's availability for assass attempt was understood to be due his last payoffs ~~to~~ he had received from gambling interests. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18

19

received 19
CIA support

Roselli tells CIA he knows Cuban exile leader, ^{7 Dem. Revolu. Front} ^{Varona} it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination.

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20

As late as 6/10/64 - it was reported that Miami gangster elements were ^{offering} \$150,000 to assass Castro - this could explain why Varona so available when approached by Roselli.

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20

In '67 IER, notes that case officer ~~XXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXX~~ said that the program reactivated
 in 4/62 & had been shut down following B.P.
 in 4/61 - he felt that something was going
 on in term. "It is possible that C.I.A.
 simply found itself involved in providing
 additional resources for independent opera-
 tions that the syndicate already had
 under way" ... "In a sense ~~the~~ C.I.A. may
 have been peppy-banking on the syndicate
 and in addition to its material contribution,
 was also supplying an aura of official
 sanction."

21

Considerations:

1/ ^{Possible} Indep crim syndicate operates re
 Castro prior to C.I.A involvement in
 late 1960. ~~to~~ May have continued
 after B.P 4/61 shutdown & be ongoing
 in some form when reactivated by C.I.A.
 in 4/62

2/ Frank Sturges may have had
 contact w/ crim syndicate. Cuba
 have been used by syndicate in its
 activities.

22

3. Sturges prob'ly knew Onta.
 However, Sturges not in Cuba when Onta
 given assassin's role. But
 Sturges may have fabricated his
 story for Miami group

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25

Antonio Verrano - never C.I.A. ¹¹¹¹¹⁹⁴⁹ temple
 but was connected w/ ALPHA-66, Cuban
 exile movement. He proposed Castro assassination
 on 3 occasions ^{to CIA} 12/60, 7/62, 4/66 & was
 rebuffed each time.

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Agent Messages in 61 re Castro assass

26

5 agent messages made reference to plan to kill Castro or proposing same.
3 related to same operation, 2 were separate proposals. No indication that these resulted from separate CIA initiative.
LA Division prepared summary of messages forwarded to Review Staff on 8/8/75.
Records, Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. Subject not covered in Church Committee interim report.

27

B messages: relate same plan

(1st) 3/27/61 sent by agency asset (AMBRONC/S) re-proposed sabotage of electric company in Havana - coordinate w/ attempt to kill Castro at public appearance (as in accordance w/ Gen'l Plan)

no record of message answered
(2nd) 3/29/61 - (AMBRONC/S) sends 2nd message plan scheduled for 4/9/61, message answered on 3/30 agreeing to plan - addressed Gen'l issue but didn't commit on proposal to kill Castro

(3rd) 4/5/61 - presumably from (AMBRONC/S) 11111950
persons he had been directed to conduct only had arms for

"your military aid is decisive. If it does not come it is that we are lost. No indication message answered"

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50 men, said to carry out 4/9/61 plan would make it impossible to maintain clandestine org. in Cuba

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The 4 agent named in plan

28

- ① (AMBRONC/5) - a) 201 file opened on 8/15/60
POA issued 12/18/61
[OA] issued 1/31/62
debriefing on Nov 1960 -
indicates that he had contact
w/ plotters against CASTRO &
claimed to have attempted to
make ~~some~~ ^{similar} plans. Infiltrated
on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated
3/3/61
exfiltrated
6/19/61

Sold mission was to org. resistance
groups

(c) infiltrated
12/17/61
exfiltrated
3/29/62

still same mission

(d) infiltrated
5/2/62 ⁰⁹
(arrested [5/24/62] + executed [5/30/62] ⁰⁹)

reported to never admit was CIA agent

29

[name not in McHaven's book given by Castro] ⁰⁸

- ② (AMCOAX/1) - ¹¹¹¹¹⁹⁵¹ (AMBRONC/5) asked to contact
him re gen'l plan for 7/61

a) POA - 1/5/61
mission was to org. paramilitary acti-
vities in Cuba

infiltrated
2/61
exfiltrated
7/61 following B.P

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29

b) reinfilitrated

7/29/61 same mission

arrested

08

(8/17/61) [— serving 30 year term
in Mc Gowan's book]

③ (AMPUG/1) — another (AMBRON) contact
for 4/61 plan

a) recruited in 9/60 + infiltrated then
receives and drops in 12/60

returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P.

b) infiltrated

4/29/61 — mission to org. resistance
groups + conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 + 30 year term
name in Mc Gowan's book]

30

④ (AMPANIC/1) — another (AMBRON) 4/61 contact

a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60

POA — 1/30/61

MOC done 8/12/60

mission to org. resistance in
Havana + Pinar del Rio

b) infiltrated 3/3/61 09, 08

arrested (4/23/61 — 30 year term)
in Mc Gowan's book]

c) was infiltrated on 8/60

infiltrated 11/60

(prior to POA) 11111952

mission was sabotage + assass.

of prominent Cuban communist
members in Castro entourage

recent criticism his family members
in Cuba at that time

31

his case officer says assass. not authorized
any assass. effort would be in (AMPANIC's) own initiative

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4/9/62

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TAB D AMLASH OPERATION

1 1977 IGR says actual nature & sign. of AMLASH is much diff. than Book I

Book I suggests that Amlash may have been Castro agent w/ provocation mission that would justify LHO retaliation - in alternative Amlash was a security risk by which details of plotting could have become known to Castro, providing same provocation & whatever the reasoning Amlash should have been reported to W.C.

2 "We believe that neither of these applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and Amlash/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for Amlash/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against CASTRO. Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

5 Comment

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"It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time - nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA relationship with AMLASH/1

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5 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact w/ potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. On terms of the relationship that he had w/ the CIA the critical period, for purposes of the paper, is therefore between 5 September and 22 November 1963.

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLAH case officer ^{approved} ~~referred~~ AMLAH as chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom to may find persons susceptible to long distance & covert disciplines - Cable also spells out long range requirement prior to action based on Amblak possible internal organization

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meetings/Amblak "Amblak still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, Amblak still awaiting for US reveal plan of action

1 GR commex - actual reference to "inside job" did not specify Castro as suggested in Book II as p. 4 but directed to more gen'l ? of how to bring about change - not w/ specific connotation of Book II

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10

"The fact remains that whatever views Amblask/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amblask/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 - Amblask case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amblask even tho Amblask told Amulship he does not "intend to see your friend again"
(Several) officers in Paris had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 - case officer cable HQ that Amblask believed to have "necessary people and equipment inside Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

Amblask wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amblask determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

11111955

Des Fitzgerald planned meeting - D.F. to rep. self as personal rep of RFK + assurance of full U.S. support. There is a change of the plan to get in Cuba

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11

10/29/63 - Amblach meets w/ Fitzgerald in Paris. Case officer also at meeting

12

11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizes meeting of D.F. w/ Amblach
U.S. support only after real coup effected + group involved in position to request U.S. support.
U.S. won't commit to isolated uprising

B

D.F. in 1967 IGR recalls that Amblach repeatedly requested high powered rifle w/ telescopic sights + other weapons to kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated he rejected the request.

Case officer memo said nothing of operational nature discussed at Fitzg. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of Amblach's meeting in New York re Amblach's reaction to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting - Amblach happy about policy but not fact that wasn't given technical assistance for operational plan.

14

If Amblach doesn't get advice and materials from U.S. got technician he will become fed up + we'll lose progress made

Comment Book II at p. 11111956
Amblach's feelings re Fitzg. meeting as unclear - IGR says this not true as corroborated by above contact report

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11/19/63 - Fitz. approver telling Ambush that he would be given a cache inside Cuba, to include high power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Ambush tells CIA officer he plan return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ cable (Paris) to delay Ambush departure to permit one more meeting which Ambush requested

On same day, Ambush agrees to delay departure of its something interesting. Case officer said couldn't assure it but it was a meeting Ambush requested.

16

IFR ^{sup} this is highly speculative evidence of indication that Ambush might receive specific support he requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets w/ Ambush in afternoon

conclusion

11... there is every indication ~~11/11/57~~ that during President Kennedy's life Ambush/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot ~~SECRET~~ directed against CASTRO

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Tab E - Materials Forwarded to W.C

Tab F - Mex Cy Coverage of Oswald Visit

Intel. Sources on Oswald's Visit
to Mex City in '63

1. Unilateral Coverage
umbrella type project { 2 IPSTICK - multi-line phone taps
3 photo sites, mobile surveillance
can + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - ^{tel. co.} teletype taps - by [local
~~emp.~~ emp.] - handled by com. office.
Mex & Mex - Amer recruited agents

3 photographs etc subcript
under STICK

managed by a magazine } LIMITED - fixed to directly of post
Soviet Embassy
LILYRIC - alternate photo base on same
street as limited fine ~~gate~~
LICALLA - south side of Soviet Compound
backdoor - get good ED photos
of Soviet personnel

closed down when Station receives word
that photo of the "unidentified man"
was being released by W.C.

Film collected 3 times/week from
limited and Selye sites
Secalla film processed on outside
by the agent like the above

3 mobile surveillance done by 2 American
staff officers - had team of 6 recruited
agents - team could be activated by
radio from Limited site whenever someone
of interest left the ~~station~~ ^{SECRET} Soviet Embassy

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3 ²⁴ [unilateral] mail intercept; Libright -
handled by American case officer.

²⁴ [Liaison] Coverage
unreliable measure as was the nature
of [Mexican] services at the time

4 Telephone tap ²⁴ [w/ Mexicans] called Libright
run by [Mex office] - 30 lines on the
at one time listening post. In 61 Station chief
became project case officer on LIAISON

Oswald Coverage

[Mex office] asked for telephone numbers of
Soviet Cuban & Satellite Embassies
[to do ²⁴ Libright tap] - we disconnected
on [unilateral] lines to avoid discovery
[Mex] connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet
lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines,
and 1 Yugoslav line - recorded,
transcribed

plus monitor made short summaries for
Station chief of interesting conversations
time lag of a day or two

5 Boris Yarasoff did Russian translation
translations ran about a week behind
date of conversation. All transcripts
made in Spanish or English since this
is all Stachef could read & because
he screened these transcripts for operational
leads

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- 6 Anne Goodpasture ^{planted} screened all photograph
as soon as station learned that
Lee Oswald had phoned Soviet Embassy
8 Oswald came to attention of listening
post operators from tap of Soviet line.
It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff
for translation because the caller
was trying to speak in Russian.
There was some delay because Station
personnel wanted to review the
photographs ^{concurrently} w/ the
typed transcript.

Tab A

Selected Newspaper Stories w/ Comment
(A 5) - Comments on Ronald Kessler's
Wash Post article of 11/26/76
re CIA w/ keen details of Oswald's call

- 2 memo - J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for PPP Helms
Subject: CIA Dissem of Info on LITO
date 10/10/63

- 2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64
re Infr developed by CIA on
LITO activities in MxLy 9/28-10/3/63
3) Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin
4) Memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from
Helms - re Infr on LITO MxLy Activities
9/28/ - 10/3/63

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Tab H & w/ CIA comments

1. Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleges CIA activity in Dallas in 1963
2. " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA told to false Oswald story
3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held date on Oswald
4. Clare Booth Luce involvement w/ Cuban exile
5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents
6. John Goshko story 11/13/76 alleging Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy
7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro
8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LHO in 1960

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